The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Inequality in Japan¹

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¹The views expressed are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the BOJ/BIS.

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Motivation: growing interest on inequality

Impacts of monetary easing on inequality have attracted increasing attention recently

- Cohan (2014): "Mr. Bernanke's extraordinary QE program, started in the wake of the financial crisis, has only widened the gulf between haves and have-nots."
- Krugman (2014): "The belief that QE systematically favors the kinds of assets the wealthy own is wrong or at least overstated."
- Bernanke (2015): "Monetary policy is a blunt tool which certainly affects the distribution of income and wealth, although whether the net effect is to increase or reduce inequality is *not clear*."

Motivation: growing interest on inequality

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- Cohan (2014): "Mr. Bernanke's extraordinary QE program, started in the wake of the financial crisis, has only widened the gulf between haves and have-nots."
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- Bernanke (2015): "Monetary policy is a blunt tool which certainly affects the distribution of income and wealth, although whether the net effect is to increase or reduce inequality is not clear."
 - **⇒** Empirical issue!

Existing empirical studies

Motivation

Empirical observations are mixed

- Coibion et al. (2017): Income and consumption inequality across U.S. households respond counter-cyclically to monetary policy shocks
 - \circ Interest rate $\uparrow \rightarrow$ Income inequality \uparrow
- Mummtaz and Theophipoulou (2016): The same result holds in the U.K.
 - Inequality declines in booms: US/UK
- Saiki and Frost (2014): The opposite is true using Japanese data
 - \circ Interest rate $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Income inequality \uparrow
- Domanski et al. (2016): Unconventional monetary policy may have widened wealth inequality, in particular through an upsurge in stock prices

Questions and Findings (1)

Question 1:

Motivation

- Does a monetary policy affects inequalities?
 - \Rightarrow Yes
 - o MP shocks matter in earnings inequality
 - other inequality measures such as disposable income or consumption inequality does not matter
 - the direction is different from the US/UK
 - \circ depends on the sample period \Rightarrow The effects **disappear recently**

Questions and Findings (2)

Question 2:

Motivation

- Does the unconventional monetary policy (QE) matter for the relationship between monetary policy and inequality?
 - \Rightarrow No
 - o no regime switching
 - rather continuous changes in economic environment
 - o structural changes of Japanese economy in 1981-2008

Questions and Findings (3)

Question 3:

Motivation

- What kind of transmission mechanism works?
 - ⇒ Labor market flexibility may matter on the relationship between monetary policy and inequality
 - using New Keynesian DSGE model

What we do

Motivation

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This paper

- Study the distributional effects of monetary policy, using the micro-level data on Japanese households.
- Draw the broad picture of the effects:
 - focusing on inequality measures of income, consumption, and wealth based on the micro-level data
 - 2. using both the theoretical model and several data sets
 - 3. using a fairly long-span data sample: periods of conventional and unconventional monetary policy regimes

Potential transmission channels

- 1. Earnings heterogeneity channel ← Japan: This paper
 - the response of earnings to a monetary policy shock differs
- 2. Job creation channel

Motivation

- job creation/destruction following a MP shock
- 3. Income composition channel \leftarrow US: Coibion et al. (2017)
 - the income composition of different income types differs
- 4. Portfolio channel
 - the size and composite of asset portfolio differs
- 5. Saving redistribution channel \leftarrow **Doepke and Schneider (2006)**
 - a transfer from lenders to borrowers by a subsequent rise in inflation caused by monetary easing

I. Data & Estimation

Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)

- by the ministry of internal affairs and communications
- Monthly survey on household income and expenditures
 - January 1981 December 2008
 - The number of observations: 8,000
 - Panel data: 6 months
 - Two-or-more household members only
 - Single household and wealth info. available only after 2002
- Focus on full-time employees (household head): 25–59
 - Self-employed, retirees and unemployed are excluded
- Construct quarterly series of variables on economic inequality
 - o for time series analysis


FIES (cont.)

Motivation

Definition of Variables

- 1. Earnings y_L
 - Sum of labor income of all household members
- 2. Total income y: y_L + capital income + private transfer
- 3. Disposable income y_D : y + public transfers taxes/premiums
- 4. Nondurable expenditures c_{ND}
 - Housing, purchasing cars and other durables are excluded
- **5.** Total expenditure c_T : c_{ND} + durables (housing excluded)
- Equivalized by OECD equivalent scale





Estimation methodology

Motivation

Estimate the impulse responses of inequality measures to a monetary policy shock, using the LLP by Jordà (2005):

$$\frac{\partial Y_{t+h}}{\partial u_t^R} \equiv \mathbb{E}\left(Y_{t+h}|u_t^R=1;M_t\right) - \mathbb{E}\left(Y_{t+h}|u_t^R=0;M_t\right)$$

- Y_{t+h} : inequality measure of interest such as the variance of log of earnings at period t + h
- u_t^R : shock to the short-term nominal interest rate at period t
- M_t: macroeconomic factors at period t
 - Table 2 in the full paper

Estimation methodology (cont.)

Estimate the impulse responses of inequality measures to a monetary policy shock, using the LLP by Jordà (2005):


$$\begin{split} \underbrace{Y_{t+h}}_{\text{inequality at }t+h} - Y_t &= \alpha_h + \Pi_h(L) M_t + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{t+h}}_{\text{innovation}} \\ \Pi_h(L) X_t &= \Pi_{h,0} X_t + \Pi_{h,1} X_{t-1} + ... + \Pi_{h,d_1} X_{t-d_1} \\ M_t &= \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \mathit{TFP}_t \\ \mathit{Factor}_t \\ \Delta R_t \end{bmatrix} \Leftarrow \mathsf{Monetary policy variable} \end{split}$$

Estimation methodology (cont.)

Advantages of LLP:


- Robustness to model misspecifications:
 - ⇒ choice of explanatory variables and the number of lags
- Flexibility of model specifications
- o Coibion et al. (2016) also use the LLP by Jordà (2005)

Monetary policy instrument




Baseline: 1981Q1-1998Q4, Shadow rate: after 1999Q1

Monetary policy instrument



Baseline: 1981Q1-1998Q4, Shadow rate: after 1999Q1



• Response of economic inequality to an **expansionary** MP shock



U.S. Economy

Motivation







Figure 4 in Coibion et al. (2017)




Channel through job creation




Add umemployed using the unemployment rate: earnings of unemployed = 0

Responses of inequality: 1981-2008



Red line: 1981-1998, Black line: 1981-2008



 footnotesizeHow the estimated impulse response functions of earnings inequality vary with the sample period? ⇒ rolling estimates

Empirical observations

- 1. Impact of expansionary monetary policy on income inequality is procyclical, arises mainly from procyclical response of earnings inequality. \Rightarrow Earnings heterogeneity channel matters in Japan
- 2. Once-prevailing distributional effects **diminish** during 2000s
- 3. Possibility that a decline in earnings inequality due to job creation channel counters its rise from earnings heterogeneity channel
- 4. Transmission of income inequality to consumption inequality is less than one-to-one

Accounting for observations

To address to these observations, we conduct three additional analyses:

- 1. Two-sector DSGE model with labor market frictions
 - illustrate how the distributional effects of monetary policy change with the structure of the economy
- 2. Industry-level aggregate data sets
- 3. Micro-level data on households' financial assets and liabilities
 - o check whether the model's predictions accord with the data

II. Model (under revision)

Literature: Theory

Motivation

Models of inequality:

- Monetary policy shocks:
 - Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012), Gornemann et al. (2016), Auclert (2019), McKay et al. (2016)
- Fiscal policy shocks:
 - o Oh and Reis (2012), McKay and Reis (2015)
 - ↑ Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) Models
- Two-agent New Keyesian model (TANK):
 - o Debortoli and Gali (2016)
- Mechanism behind earnings inequality in HANK models
 - ⇒ idiosyncratic income risks (stochastic, but exogenous)

Literature: Theory

Motivation

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- Mechanism behind earnings inequality in HANK models ⇒ idiosyncratic income risks (stochastic, but exogenous)
 - Want to explain earnings inequality

Model

Motivation

Basic Idea behind the Model

MP shocks matter ⇒ nominal rigidities

Explaining earnings inequality:

- What determines labor income?
 - o one sector model without any frictions in the labor market, labor income is determined from productivity of workers
- Different wages among sectors? ⇒ arbitrage and equal wage in equilibrium
 - MP shocks do not matter
 - \Rightarrow Multi-sector with different wage + labor market frictions

Our model

- Two production sectors (X and Z)
 - each of which has final goods firms and intermediate goods firms
 - consumption composite consists of goods X and goods Z
- Two types of households (X and Z)
 - each of which has two types of members: "father (mother)" and "son (daughter)"
 - Attached: father supplies its labor inputs to one of two sectors
 - **Mobile**: son can supply its labor inputs to both sectors
 - father and son live together: same budget and combined utility function

Objectives of households

Motivation

Each type of households (s = X, Z) maximizes:

$$U_{s,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{q=0}^{\infty} \beta^q u(C_{s,t+q}, C_{s,t+q-1}, N_{s,t+q}, H_{s,t+q}) \right]$$

$$u(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot) = \log(C_{s,t+q} - bC_{s,t+q-1}) - \theta \frac{N_{s,t+q}^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} - \phi \frac{H_{s,t+q}^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta}$$

- N: attached labor input, H: mobile labor input
- β : discount factor, C: consumption, b: habit
- \circ η : Frrisch elasticity of labor supply
- \circ θ , ϕ : labor disutility parameters

Conclusion

Budget constraint

Motivation

The budget constraint:

$$C_{s,t} + \frac{B_{s,t}}{P_t} \ge \begin{bmatrix} \frac{W_{s,t}}{P_t} N_{s,t} + \frac{W_t}{P_t} H_{s,t} \\ + \left(\frac{\Pi_{X,t} + \Pi_{Z,t}}{P_t}\right) \gamma_{\Pi_s} + \left(\frac{R_{X,t} K_X + R_{Z,t} K_Z}{P_t}\right) \gamma_{K_s} \\ + R_{t-1} \frac{B_{s,t-1}}{P_t} + \kappa_B \left(\frac{B_{s,t}}{P_t}\right)^2 \end{bmatrix},$$

- \circ P_t : price level, $B_{s,t}$: bond holdings
- \circ $W_{s,t}$: wage of each sector, W_t : wage of mobile workers
- \circ Π_s : profit of each sector, K_s : capital stock
- \circ $R_{x,t}$: nominal rental costs of the capital stock
- $\circ \gamma_{\Pi_s}$: share of dividends, γ_{K_s} : share of capital stock
- \circ κ_B : adjustment costs of bond holding
- Capital stock is fixed at some level

Intermediate firm's price setting

Data & Estimation

• In sector X, the intermediate firm i choose the prices to solve:

$$\max_{P_{X,t}(i)} \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{q=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t+q} \frac{\Lambda_{t+q}}{\Lambda_t} \frac{\Pi_{t+q,X}(i)}{P_{t+q}}\right]$$

subject to

$$\Pi_{X,t+q,X}(i) = P_{X,t+q}(i)x_{t+q}(i) - MC_{X,t+q}(i)x_{t+q}(i) - \frac{\kappa_X}{2} \left(\frac{P_{X,t+q}(i)}{P_{X,t+q-1}(i)} - 1\right)^2 P_{X,t+q}X_{t+q},$$

$$x_t(i) = AN_{X,t}(i)^{\alpha\mu} U_{X,t}(i)^{\alpha(1-\mu)} K_{X,t}(i)^{1-\alpha}$$

- $\circ x_{t+q}(i)$: intermediate good, $MC_{X,t+q}(i)x_{t+q}(i)$: marginal costs
- \circ Λ_t : Lagrange multiplier, κ_X : price adjustment parameter

Conclusion

Demand curves

Motivation

Final goods:

$$ilde{X}_t = \left[\int_0^1 x_t(i)^{1-arepsilon^{-1}} di
ight]^{rac{arepsilon}{arepsilon - 1}}$$

Demand functions for the differentiated products produced by firm

$$x_t(i) = \left[\frac{P_{X,t}(i)}{P_{X,t}}\right]^{-\varepsilon} \tilde{X}_t$$

Rest of the model

Motivation

Price index of the final good:

$$P_{X,t} = \left[\int_0^1 P_{X,t}(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$$

 The aggregator constructs the composite of consumption goods using the aggregate technology

$$C_t = X_t^{\rho} Z_t^{1-\rho}$$

Demand curve:

$$X_t = \rho\left(\frac{P_t}{P_{X,t}}\right) C_t$$


Monetary policy:

$$\log R_t = \rho_n \log R_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_n) \varphi \log \pi_t + \epsilon_{R,t}$$

Setup

- Assumption (1): $\rho > 1 \rho$
 - Household X enjoys a higher level of consumption than does household 7
 - X receives higher earnings than Z at steady state
- Assumption (2): $\kappa_X > \kappa_Z$
 - Monetary policy affects two sectors differently around steady state
 - the price of goods X is adjusted at a slower pace than that of goods Z in the wake of a monetary policy shock
 - \circ goods X attract a larger demand than goods Z, because goods X becomes cheaper than goods Z
- Other parameters are symmetric
 - no wealth inequality
 - Table 1 in full paper

After an expansionary monetary policy shock



Mechanism

Motivation


- The cross-sector heterogeneity arises from the difference in price stickiness between $P_{X,t}$ and $P_{Z,t}$
- Goods price of sector X becomes relatively cheaper in the short-run \Rightarrow the demand towards goods X_t becomes larger than the demand for goods Z_t

$$X_t = \rho\left(\frac{P_t}{P_{X,t}}\right) C_t$$

• Intermediate goods firm i, facing a greater demand, employs a larger amount of attached labor inputs $N_{X,t}(i) \Rightarrow$ the nominal wage for those labor inputs $W_{X,t}$ increases disproportionately compared to other wages $W_{Z,t}$ and W_t

Results

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2010 2015

Results

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(2) Labor turnover ratio Proportion of temporary worker 26 r Labor force survey 4.0 -Monthly labor surcey oegod 3.8 22 20 3.6 № 18 3.4 16 14 12 3.0

Source: Labor force survey and Monthly labor survey.

Year



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1985


1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Motivation

Year

1990 1995 2000 2005

Distribution of financial assets matters



• $\gamma_{K_X} \in \{0.4, 0.5, 0.6\}$



Mechanism (2)

- The distribution of capital stock holding substantially affects the dynamics of both earnings and consumption inequality following monetary policy shocks
- $\gamma_{K,X}=0.4$ (low): household X becomes less wealthy \Rightarrow supplies more labor inputs to the goods producing sectors due to the negative wealth effect
 - Opposite is true in household Z
- ullet Boosting earnings inequality across households + less consumption inequality

Conclusion

Motivation

Empirically and theoretically study how monetary policy shocks are transmitted to inequality.

- Distributional effects of monetary policy were once present, but have become statistically insignificant during the 2000s
- Labor market flexibility is central to the dynamics of income inequality after the monetary policy shocks
- Transmission of income inequality to consumption inequality is minor
- Distributions of financial assets and liabilities don't play a significant role

Conclusion

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
Appendix

Thank you!


Appendix Figures




Responses of macro variables



Cross-firm heterogeneity to earnings inequality: baseline



Cross-firm heterogeneity to earnings inequality: 1981-2008



Data Details



Data Details

Motivation

Definition of Variables

- Labor income y:
 - sum of monthly labor income of household members, which include household head, his/her spouse and other household members
- Nondurable expenditure c:
 - o food; repair and maintenance of houses; fuel, light and water charges; domestic utensils, non-durable goods, and services; clothing and footwear; medical care; transportation and communication, excluding purchase of vehicles and bicycles; education; culture and recreation, excluding recreational durable goods; and other consumption expenditure, excluding remittance

Conclusion

Motivation

Adjusted Gini coefficient

$$G^* \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\bar{N}} \sum_{j=1}^{\bar{N}} |x_i - x_j|}{2\bar{N} \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{N}}} = G \frac{N}{\bar{N}} + \frac{\bar{N} - N}{\bar{N}}$$

Assumption: earnings of unemployed = 0